The Convention process organizes international action in a methodical manner.

It first sets an objective, to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a safe level. It also defines principles that should govern international action towards this objective, such as equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. It goes on to define initial commitments reflecting these principles, distinguishing between general ones for all Parties and specific time-bound emissions commitments for Annex 1 Parties. It then provides that initial commitments regarding emissions reductions of Annex 1 Parties would be reviewed at the first session of the COP, then no later than 31 December 1998, and thereafter at regular intervals determined by the COP, until the objective of the Convention is met.

Further commitments, specific to Annex 2 Parties, regarding funding and technology, are then defined, and it is clarified that the extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments will depend on the effective implementation by developing country Parties of their commitments related to financial resources and transfer of technology. The priority to economic and social development and poverty eradication is recalled.

Article 4 of the Convention defines commitments for Parties.

Commitments enumerated in Art. 4.1 are for all Parties. They include a variety of activities involving the preparation of emissions inventories, the integration of combating climate change (both emissions limitation and adaptation) into national policies and the provision of information to other countries of activities in this regard through periodic national communications.

Commitments outlined in Art.4.2 are for Annex 1 Parties. These are committed to take the lead in global efforts to modify longer-term trends in greenhouse gas emissions and to implement policies and measures with the aim of returning their emissions to their 1990 levels.

Under Article 4.3, OECD countries listed in Annex 2 are committed to fund the incremental cost of actions by developing countries to fulfil their commitments under Article 4.1 as well as the full cost of their national communications. They are also committed under Articles 4.5 and 4.4 to transfer technology to help developing countries meet their commitments and to assist the most vulnerable developing countries in meeting the cost of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change.

Finally, it is made clear that the extent to which developing countries will effectively implement their commitments will depend on the effective implementation by developed countries of their commitments related to financial resources and transfer of technology and that development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries.

This differentiation of commitments for different categories of Parties reflects in practice the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

Art.4.2. (d) provides that COP1 would review the adequacy of Art. 4.2. commitments and that a second review would take place no later than 31 December 1998, and after that at regular intervals until the objective of the convention is met.

Already at COP1, in Berlin in 1995, industrialized countries called for a move beyond the initial framework and for the negotiation of new commitments. The first review under Article 4.2 (d) of commitments under 4.2 (a) and (b) found these commitments inadequate. A hard negotiation followed and resulted in the “Berlin Mandate”, launching a process to define new commitments for industrialised countries after 2000, in the form of policies and measures or quantified emissions limitation or reduction objectives in defined timeframes. The Mandate recalls the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and precludes any new commitments for developing countries. The process is to be concluded by COP3 in 1997and lead to an agreement on a protocol or an amendment to the Convention.

COP3, held in Kyoto in December 1997, agreed on the text of the Kyoto Protocol.

The central provision of the Protocol is a commitment of industrialised countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to about 5 percent on average below their 1990 level over the 2008-2012 period. Each such country has an assigned amount of emissions it should not exceed. It can raise this ceiling by acquiring emissions allowances, either excess assigned amounts from other developed countries or certified emission reductions from Clean Development Mechanism projects in developing countries. These commitments are legally binding and non-compliance involves “consequences”.

Detailed modalities for implementing the Kyoto Protocol were negotiated in the following years and are embodied in the hefty Marrakesh Accords adopted at COP7 in 2001 in Marrakesh. Most countries, but not the United States and Australia among Annex 1 Parties, have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, which entered into Force in February 2005.

As soon as the text of the Kyoto Protocol was agreed, at COP3, the delegation of New Zealand, with the support of many developed countries, stated a need for new commitments by non–Annex 1 Parties. There would be assurances that non-Annex 1 Parties, except LDCs, would adopt binding emissions limitation commitments in a third commitment period, but they would not be held to these commitments if Annex 1 Parties did not fulfil their Kyoto commitments. This proposal triggered a barrage of rejection statements by developing countries and a memorable speech by Mark Mwandosya, of Tanzania, who chaired the Group of 77 at that session, culminating in the words: “we say no”.

After Kyoto, Annex 1 parties never stopped raising the issue of commitments by developing countries. All dialogues, round tables, discussions, workshops on climate change invariably include some hint or direct mention of this issue.

The idea that the call for commitments involving developing countries was then for a third commitment period rapidly faded away. It is now envisaged to place on the same footing the negotiations provided for under Article 3.9 of the Protocol and the possible process emerging in follow-up to the “Dialogue” (the fact that the COP, in establishing the Dialogue , had resolved that it would not lead to any negotiations leading to new commitments seems already lost) and even to establish between the two “some degree of synchronicity”.

When new commitments involving developing countries are discussed, the issue of how such commitments would fit within the Convention framework and the related issue of who would bear the cost of implementing them is generally not made explicit.

Within the existing Convention framework, any commitments for non-Annex 1 Parties must be under Article 4.1 and derived from its provisions. Otherwise, the Convention has to be amended. The consequence is that the provisions of Article 4.3 will apply to these new commitments, and therefore Annex 2 Parties shall provide new and additional resources needed by developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental cost of implementing measures covered by these commitments.

Agreeing to an alternative route, to amend the Convention to make possible commitments not governed by Article 4.1 and to which provisions of Article 4.3 would therefore not apply would amount , for developing countries, to agreeing that the cost of their emissions limitation efforts, found too high by the rich countries, would instead be borne by them, the poor countries.

Developing countries should therefore stick to commitments under Article 4.1. That will ensure that they not expected to bear any incremental cost and that they can concentrate their resources on their priorities, economic and social development and poverty eradication.It will remain inescapable that, as Article 4.7 provides, the extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments related to financial resources and transfer of technology.

In the absence of significant funding to cover the incremental cost, which has been the situation so far, activities that would limit greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries would be “win-win”. Developing countries have been told again and again in recent years how activities which reduce emissions can be economic and generate substantial “co-benefits”. They could focus their efforts on this class of activities. The scope for such activities can be increased through the expansion of the carbon market and the increased implementation of activities under the Clean Development Mechanism. The report of the Executive Secretary made available to the Dialogue shows that significant progress can be achieved in this manner.

This requires however that current negotiations under the AWG lead to ambitious emission reduction targets for Annex 1 Parties in the second commitment period. It also requires that “hot air “be eliminated, which can be achieved through the AWG decisions and through policies of acquiring Parties (the decision last year to include Belarus into Annex 1 with a generous “hot air” margin is an error in this regard and should not be ratified). It also requires that the United States make efforts comparable to those of other Annex I Parties and participate in the international carbon market.

When the Convention was negotiated, it was largely agreed that industrialized countries had both a greater responsibility than developing countries in causing the climate change problem because their contribution to the greenhouse gas concentration was predominant, and greater capabilities to act to resolve it because they were richer. That is why they were expected to take the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions and to provide funding to assist developing countries in combating climate change and its adverse effects.

Current calls to strengthen developing country commitments seem predicated on a significant change, perhaps a reversal, in relative responsibilities and capacities. Certain facts are mentioned in support of this view, such as the growth of greenhouse gas emissions in China, which are said to equal those of the United States, or the prospect that, “soon”, total emissions of non-Annex I Parties will overtake those of Annex I Parties. That, it is claimed, makes it urgent to act.

Such arguments obscure the fact that it is greenhouse gas concentrations accumulated over time -and not instant emissions-that cause the climate change threat, and that an equitable approach to responsibility determination has to consider per capita performance.

In 2004, greenhouse gas emissions of Annex I Parties represented 49 percent of the world total and those of non-Annex I Parties 41 percent of that total. Per capita emissions were respectively 12 and 2.5 tons of CO2 per person.

Annex I Parties had a 71 percent share in cumulative emissions since 1950. Non-Annex I Parties had 29 percent.

Contributions per person were 501 and 50 tons respectively.

Each American emits more over 20 tons of CO2 per year while each Chinese emits 4. The United States has contributed over 26 percent of cumulative emissions and China less than 10 percent. Per capita, it is 803 and 67 tons of CO2 respectively.

Between 1990 and 2004, the energy (and emissions) intensity of the Chinese economy has decreased by 4.2 percent annually on average. In the United States, the rate was 1.7 percent.

These numbers provide no basis for asking developing countries to strengthen their commitments. Annex I Parties must strengthen theirs. That is the role of AWG. The main purpose of the new AWGLTC should be to include the United States in international efforts and to link them to the international carbon market so as to maximise its size.